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Chapter 17: An Attempt to Improve the Existing Probate Law
Vartuhi Torounian
Code Section Affected
Probate Code §§ 21305, 21700 (new), 150 (repealed); 1811, 1813, 1827,
1863, 11603, 21306, 21320 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure § 366.3
(new).
AB 1491 (Kaloogian); 2000 STAT. Ch. 17
Has a dead man any use for money? Is it possible for a dead man to have
any money? What world does a dead man belong to? T'other world. What
world does money belong to? This world. However can money be a
corpse's? Can a corpse own it, want it, spend it, claim it, miss it?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Money belongs to this world and because people cannot take it with them to the
other realm, they create wills2 or trusts3 indicating to whom they wish their wealth
to go upon their death. To insure that the intent of the deceased is faithfully
executed, a "no contest" clause is written into a will or a trust conditioning a
beneficiary's right to receive gifts through the instrument upon agreement to all of
its terms.4 Consequently, if a beneficiary challenges the testamentary document or
any of its provisions, she risks forfeiting her share of the estate.'
1. CHARLES DICKENS, OUR MUTUAL FRIEND 47 (Penguin Books Inc., Stephen Grill, 1971).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (Pocket Edition 1996) (defining "will" as "a document by which a
person directs his or her estate to be distributed upon death").
3. See id. at 636 (defining "trust" as "a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of
another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary)").
4. See Ronald Z. Domsky, In Terrorem Clauses: More Bark than Bite?, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 493
(1994) (indicating that to prevent disgruntled beneficiaries from challenging the will or any of its terms, most people
include a "no contest," otherwise known as "in terrorem" or "forfeiture clause" in their wills); id. (stating that a "no
contest" clause "is one that provides that any person who contests the will shall forfeit all interests she otherwise
would have received under the will"); see also Sharon J. Ormond, No Contest Clauses in California Wills and
Trusts: How Lucky Do You Feel Playing the Wheel of Fortune?, 18 WHIT71ER L. REV. 613, 614 (1997) (citing
California Will Forms Manual at 2.16 (CEB 1966)) (indicating that the generic "no contest" clause used in
California wills and trusts states:
If any beneficiary under this Will in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks this Will or
any of its provisions, any share or interest in my estate given to that contesting beneficiary under this
Will is revoked and shall be disposed of in the same manner provided herein as if that contesting
beneficiary had predeceased me without issue).
5. See Ormond, supra note 4, at 614 (stating that forfeiture is the result of a challenge to a will or terms
which contains a "no contest" clause); id. (defining forfeiture as "complete loss of gift, or reduction of the gift to
a nominal amount, such as one dollar"); id. (asserting that the above, in turn, forces the beneficiaries to accept the
intended bequest or face the consequences of challenging the testamentary document and losing it all).
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However, in some cases, a "no contest" clause does not stop a disgruntled
beneficiary from challenging such a document; thus, forcing courts to take on the
difficult task of determining whether the clause applies.6 Because prior law does not
provide clear guidance as to the application of "no contest" clauses, courts have
made inconsistent decisions in the interpretation of the clause.7 In response to such
decisions, Chapter 17 specifies actions which trigger a "no contest" clause and
recognizes circumstances in which certain actions, as a matter of public policy, will
not violate an existing "no contest" clause.8
Chapter 17 also addresses concerns raised by recent case law in regards to the
enforcement of oral will contracts. 9 An oral will contract is an agreement made by
a person before his death that either required the testator to make a "particular
testamentary disposition of [his] property, or prevented [him] from revoking or
modifying [his] existing will."10 In the past few years, courts have deviated from the
strict standard of requiring clear and convincing evidence of an agreement or a
promise before recovery, thus making it easier for plaintiffs to succeed on their
claims." In response, Chapter 17 reinstates the burden of providing clear and
convincing evidence of an agreement in oral will contract actions and clear and
convincing evidence of a promise in oral will agreement claims brought under
doctrines permitting the enforcement of promise without consideration. 12
6. See generally Estate of Pittman, 63 Cal. App. 4th 290,73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622 (1998) (demonstrating a case
in which the court had to decide whether a challenge to an instrument defining the character of property disposed
in the will violates the generic "no contest" clause contained in the document).
7. See Estate of Basore, 19 Cal. App. 3d 623, 630-31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 874, 878-79 (1971) (using strict
construction of "no contest" clause, the court held that an action seeking determination of the legality of the gifts
disposed within a will is not an attack, opposition or contest of the will for nether the plain meaning of the will nor
the words used in the "no contest" clause indicate that the deceased intended such action to trigger the "no contest"
clause); see also In Estate of Kazian, 59 Cal. App. 3d 797, 801-03, 130 Cal. Rptr. 908, 909-11 (1976)
(demonstrating that although the action brought by the plaintiff was based on an independent claim, because it had
a possibility of disturbing the distribution of the decedent's wealth under her will, it thwarted the decedent's
intentions as to how her property should be disposed; thus, violating the "no contest" clause within the will);
Sharon, supra note 4, at 657-59 (explaining the history of the no contest clause in California as being long and
uncertain); id. (stating that "[clourts have applied [the no contest clause] as they sow feet to the facts of each case
and by doing so have created an inconsistent and unpredictable results in the enforcement of the no contest clause").
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305 (b) (enacted by Chapter 17).
9. Infra note 45, 51 and accompanying notes.
10. See Jeff G. Carchidi, California Oral Will Contracts: The Decline of Testator Intent in the Shadow of
Equitable Estoppel, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1189-92 (1999) (stating that a will might be invalid if prior
to his death the deceased made one of two types of will contracts: contract to make a will or a contract not to revoke
a will); id. (explaining that a contract to make a will is an agreement in which the deceased "promises to make a
particular testamentary disposition in favor of a third person in consideration for services rendered by that person");
id. (noting that the contract is breached when the deceased fails to include in his will what she agreed upon in
exchange for the other parties promise). Id. (asserting that in most circumstances, a contract not to revoke a will is
made between spouses); id. (asserting that such an agreement states that each spouse promises to leave his or her
estate to the surviving spouse in consideration for the surviving spouse to dispose the rest of the estate as specified
in the will or in a contractual agreement).
11. Infra Part 11.B.
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (enacted by Chapter 17).
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II. PRIOR AND EXISTING
Under existing California law, a "no contest"13 clause would be ineffective
against specified types of actions where such an action is based on probable cause.
4
In determining whether a particular action falls within the scope of a "no contest"
clause, a strict construction of the clause is required. 15 A beneficiary may petition
the court to determine whether certain motions or actions will violate a "no contest"
clause. 16 This petition itself is not considered a violation of the clause. 7
The existing law also states that a contract to make a will or not to revoke one
is enforceable only if the terms of the will and the contract are consistent, the will
expressly mentions the contract in controversy and there is evidence from which the
court may construe the terms of the contract, or if there is a writing signed by the
deceased indicating an agreement between the deceased and the plaintiff.'"
Furthermore, a person has one year from the date of the testator's death to bring a
contract action against the estate.' 9 However, under contract law a person has two
years from the discovery of the action to bring a contact claim not founded upon an
instrument of writing z° and four years if such writing exists.2' In other words, the
existing law has "an uncertain statue of limitations in regards to equitable and
contractual claims to distribution of an estate.,
22
III. RECENT CASE LAW: THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Historical Problems of the "No Contest" Clause
Proponents of "no contest" clauses argue that enforcement of a "no contest"
clause is necessary to reduce litigation over estates, and honor the intentions of the
deceased.23 However, courts have struggled with the correct interpretation and
13. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21300 (West Supp. 2000) (defining a "contest" as being "an attack in a
proceeding on an instrument or on a provision in an instrument"); id. (asserts that a "'no contest clause' means a
provision in an otherwise valid instrument that, if enforced, would penalize a beneficiary if the beneficiary brings
a contest").
14. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21306 (West Supp. 2000) (stating that a "no contest" clause will not effect an
action, based on enumerated claim such as forgery, which has probable cause).
15. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21304 (West Supp. 2000); see WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW WILLS AND
PROBATE § 530 (9th ed. 1990) (explaining the fact that existing law requires "no contest" clauses to be strictly
construed in deciding the intent of the deceased).
16. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21320 (West Supp. 2000).
17. Id.
18. CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West 1998).
19. Battuello v. Battuello, 64 Cal. App. 4th 842,846 - 847,75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548,550 - 551 (1998); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 366.2 (a) (West. Supp. 2000).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339.1 (West. Supp. 2000).
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (West. Supp. 2000).
22. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 4 (Jan. 11, 2000).
23. Domsky, supra note 4, at 495.
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application of "no contest" clauses.24 Prior to 1984, under common law, some courts
used strict construction to interpret a "no contest clause"." A beneficiary's action
would only constitute a contest, if the clause stated that the action was considered
a contest or the terms of the will evidenced the testator's intention for such an action
to be construed as a contest.26 On the other hand, other courts used broad
construction of the "no contest" clause and found any action threatening the
execution of the will or part of a will to be a contest; thus, thwarting the intent of the
deceased and triggering the "no contest" clause.27
Sensing a need to institute coherency within the law, in 1989, the California
Legislature passed a statute which clearly stated that "no contest" clauses must be
strictly construed.28 Unfortunately, this legislative solution was followed by
inconsistent interpretation and application by the California courts. In Burch v.
George, the California Supreme Court looked beyond the terms of the "no contest"
clause and found a violation of the clause based on an integrated estate plan theory.29
In Burch, following her husband's death, the plaintiff brought an action litigating
her pension rights against the trust which bequeathed most of her husband's assets
to his relatives. 30 Although the "no contest" clause within the trust was only in
reference to the trust instrument, the court held that a challenge to the pension plan
disposed in the trust was part of the integrated estate plan of the deceased and as
such was susceptible to the provisions of the "no contest" clause.3'
Following Burch in 1997, Genger v. Delso 3 2 held that a "no contest" clause
would apply where the plaintiff challenges a stock redemption agreement deemed
to be part of the integrated estate plan.33 In Estate of Pittman v. Lee,34 the court used
the same reasoning to find a generic "no contest" clause to apply to a document
which described the nature of the property distributed in a will.35 These cases
demonstrate how Burch reintroduced the old problem of broad interpretation of "no
contest" clauses and created additional uncertainty in the determination of whether
24. Infra notes 25 and 27.
25. In Estate of Basore, 19 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629-31,96 Cal. Rptr. 874, 878-89 (1971); In Estate of Black,
160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 592, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (1984).
26. In Estate of Basore, 19 Cal. App. 3d 623,629-31,96 Cal. Rptr. 874, 878-89 (1971); In Estate of Black,
160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 592, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (1984).
27. In Estate of Kazian, 59 Cal. App. 3d 797, 801-03, 130 Cal. Rptr. 908, 909-11(1976); In Estate of
Friedman, 100 Cal. App. 3d 810, 818-20, 161 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315-17 (1979).
28. Supra note 14.
29. 7 Cal. 4th 246, 866 P.2d 92 (1994).
30. Id. at 252-54, 866 P.2d at 98-100.
31. Id. at 260-63, 866 P.2d at 106-09.
32. 56 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527 (1997).
33. See id. at 1410, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535 (rejecting the idea that a contest is only the actions described in
the "no contest" clause, or actions attacking the trust or the terms of the trust); id. (stating that a contests may also
bee a "separate legal proceeding which is designed to thwart the testator's expressed wishes").
34. 63 Cal. App. 4th 290, 73 Cal. Rpt. 2d 622 (1998).
35. Id. at 302-05, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 629-32.
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an action falls within the scope of a "no contest" clause.36 The need for stronger
legislative intervention soon became apparent.
B. Problems in the Enforcement of Will Contract Actions
Under prior law, a will contract was enforceable only if it was in writing.37
However, California courts have held that a party will be estopped from raising the
statute as a defense in cases where the non enforcement of an oral will contract
would result in fraud.38 In such cases, under case law, in order to recover on an oral
will contract claim, the plaintiff must show the existence of a contract by offering
clear and convincing evidence of the decedent's intent to be bound by the terms of
the alleged agreement.
39
Traditionally courts have been reluctant to find clear and convincing evidence
of an agreement in oral will contract cases.40 Unlike other litigated contract actions,
most will contract actions commence after the death of the testator.4' Therefore, the
testator is no longer available to testify on his own behalf as to whether he intended
to enter into an agreement with the plaintiff.42 Consequently, plaintiffs found
proving the existence of oral will agreement difficult and recovery under equitable
principles has been limited for plaintiffs.43
Nonetheless, courts recently deviated from these precedents by making the clear
and convincing standard of proof of oral will agreements "plaintiff friendly."44 This
is evidenced by the Estate of Brenzikofer v. Schwarz,45 where the California
Appellate Court found that an oral agreement existed between the plaintiff and the
deceased based on extrinsic evidence consisting of affidavits from four non-party
46 Teafdwitnesses. The affidavits indicated that at one time in her life the deceased may
have intended to leave the house in her will to the plaintiff.47 However, one might
36. See Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 263, 866 P.2d at 109 (demonstrating the fact that although the "no contest"
clause on its face did not indicate that it was to be extended to all documents and ownership claims pertaining to
the trust, the court did so based on their finding that such actions would thwart the intent of the deceased as stated
in the trust).
37. CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West. Supp. 2000); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
38. Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 632, 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 346 (1997).
39. Notten v. Mensing, 67 P.2d 734, 736, 20 Cal. App. 2d 694, 698 (1937).
40. See Jeff G. Carchidi, California Oral Will Contracts: The Decline of Testator Intent In The Shadow Of
Equitable Estoppel, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1187, 1195-97 (1999).
41. Id. at 1207, 1216.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1198.
44. Id.
45. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1461 (1996).
46. Id. at 405, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1468.
47. See Brenzikofer, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1468, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 405 (noting that one of the affidavits
stated that the decedent made a mention of the fact that "she did not know what she would do without [appellants].
She stated that [appellants] where like her hands and feet and that they did everything for her... [Decedent]
stated ... that in her will, the house that [appellants] were living was going to be for them").
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argue that, the fact the deceased never executed a will leaving the house to the
plaintiff, indicated that perhaps the deceased changed her mind.48 By enforcing the
alleged agreement on the basis of such affidavits, the court in the Estate of
Brenzikofer
overlooked the decent's right to change her intention as to the distribution
of her property during her life [and] ... abused the narrow exception in
existing law prohibiting enforcement of oral will contracts by granting
equitable relief in the absence of clear and convicting evidence as to the
agreement between the plaintiffs and the deceased.49
In Estate of Brenzikofer and the cases that followed, upon finding that the
plaintiff materially altered her position in reliance on the testator' s promise, and that,
if the defendant were permitted to assert the statute of frauds defense, the plaintiff
would suffer an unconscionable injury, courts have granted a remedy without
scrutinizing the existence of clear and convincing evidence as to a valid agreement
between the plaintiff and the deceased.5 ° In fact, in Estate of Housely v. Haywood,51
the court went so far as to award damages to the plaintiff despite clear and
convincing evidence indicating that the deceased did not intend to enter into contract
with the plaintiff.52 These cases indicate a confusion amongst courts as to when
promissory estoppel, restitution and similar non-contractual principles should apply
in oral will contract actions; thus, calling for guidance by the Legislature.53
IV. CHAPTER 17
Chapter 17 enumerates actions not considered a contest unless specifically stated
as such in the "no contest" clause.54 For example, unless the testator expressly
prohibits an action to determine the character of property disposed in the
testamentary document, such an action is not to be considered a contest. 55 In
48. Carchidi, supra note 40, at 1211.
49. Id.
50. Byrne v. Laura, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1054,1063-1073, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 914 - 919 (1997); Estate of
Housely v. Haywood, 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 348, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 634 (1997).
51. 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (1997).
52. See id. at 353-54,65 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (demonstrating evidence which indicate that although the deceased
once wanted the plaintiff to be included in his will, the deceased changed his mind and after numerous quarrels with
the plaintiff, removed him from his will and trust).
53. ASSEMBLY MEMBER KALOOGIAN, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON AB 1491, at 4 (Apr. 29, 2000).
54. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 17) (stating that unless otherwise stated in a
"no contest" clause such action do not constitute a contest: "the filing of a creditor's claim or prosecution of an
action based upon it, an action or proceeding ro determine the character of property, a challenge to the validity of
an instrument, constant, agreement, [etc.] .... a petition for settlement or for compromise affecting the terms of the
instrument").
55. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 17).
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response to Burch, the new law states that a "challenge to the validity of an
instrument other than the instrument containing the no-contest clause is not a
contest. 56 Chapter 17 also lists action which, even if included in a "no contest"
clause, will not be barred as a matter of public policy.57 Moreover, the new
legislation amends prior law, deeming a "no contest" clause unenforceable against
a beneficiary who has a "reasonable,, 58 as opposed to "probable," cause for bringing
an action based on specified types of claims, such as forgery and revocation.5
In terms of will contracts, Chapter 17 repeals the prior law and establishes a
comprehensive statute that reflects case law precedent more accurately. 60 The new
law codifies the historic view that for an oral will agreement to be enforceable, the
court must be presented with clear and convincing evidence of an agreement
between the plaintiff and the deceased or an otherwise enforceable promise by the
deceased to the plaintiff.6' These modifications of law emphasize what courts
ignored in recent cases: the claimant must first prove the existence of an oral will
agreement or an oral promise before being able to recover under doctrines
permitting the enforcement of a promise without a consideration. 62 The statue further
states that its terms are to apply not only to contracts to make or not to revoke a will
but also other testamentary devises and instruments.63
The new law sets a coherent statue of limitations for will contract claims by
asserting that filing an action must be commenced within one year of the date of
death.64 It also explicitly mandates that the statue of limitations will not be tolled.65
56. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305(a)(1)(4) (enacted by Chapter 17).
57. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305 (b) (enacted by Chapter 17) (making explicit which actions cannot be
prohibited by a no contest clause as a matter of public policy).
58. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21306(b) (enacted by Chapter 17) (defining reasonable cause as having
"possession of facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the allegations and other factual contention
in the matter filed with the court may be proven ... after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery").
59. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 8 (Mar. 28, 2000) (stating
this minor, yet important change in the law will clarify the application of no contest clauses, as the reasonableness
standard, as opposed to the probable cause standard, is better understood by practitioners of probate law).
60. Assembly Member Kalogian, Background Information on AB 1491, at 4 (Apr. 29, 2000).
61. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700(a)(4)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 17) (stating that an oral contract will be
enforced in equity provided there is "clear and convincing evidence of an agreement between the decedent and the
claimant [or another person for the benefit of the claimant]"); see Carchidi, supra note 40, at 1195-97, 1200
(explaining what earlier courts required the plaintiff to proof in order to recover on the basis of a contract under
equitable principles).
62. Infra Part ll.B.
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (enacted by Chapter 17).
64. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 17).
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 17).
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V. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 17
A. "No Contest" Clause and Its Implications
History repeated itself as the Supreme Court in Burch v. George cast aside the
statutory requirements of strict construction and stretched the boundaries of "no
contest" clauses to reach instruments not included in the clause.66 The confusion and
uncertainty in the enforcement of "no contest" clauses became paramount.67 Thus,
in response to the court's decisions, the Legislature once again attempted to define
the application of "no contest" clauses with the enactment of Chapter 17.
By limiting the types of actions that will constitute contests, Chapter 17 forces
testators to construct more specific "no contest" clauses, so as to ensure that certain
actions are prohibited by the terms of the clause.68 For example, a challenge to the
validity of a document is not a contest unless otherwise stated in a "no contest"
clause. This, in turn will end generic "no contest" clauses creating certainty and
predictability in the enforcement and application of "no contest" clauses. 69 Whether
an action violates a "no contest" clause within the testamentary instrument will no
longer be subject to a court's discretionary determination.70 By examining the words
of the clause, and the appropriate statute, litigants will be able to determine if the
action is prohibited and, if it is not, whether it is allowed under the new statute for
public policy reasons.7' This will prevent parties from inadvertently violating a "no
contest" clause and forfeiting their inheritance as the plaintiffs did in Pittman v.
Lee.72 Furthermore, increased predictability in courts decisions will reduce the
number of petitions to construe such clauses.73
Although this statute seems to be the perfect solution to the historic problem of
construing "no contest" clauses, it does have its limitations. Forcing a testator to
anticipate all possible grounds on which beneficiaries might challenge a will is
questionable.74 Hence, in order to insure that the "no contest" clause will apply to
66. Infra Part lI.A.
67. Id.; see also Assembly Member Kaloogian, Background Information on ABJ491, at 5 (Apr. 29, 2000)
(arguing that as a result of the holding in Burch, "the use of generic 'no contest' clause, which may be combined
with extrinsic evidence to create the possibility of an integrated plan, has introduced an unnecessary level of
uncertainty and ultimately litigation into this area").
68. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMIFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 6-7 (Mar. 28, 2000)
(indicating that in order to create a more effective will, "attorneys will construct wills and trust in a way that
conforms to the requirements of the statue, thus putting an end to unclear, generic no contest clauses").
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. CAL. PROB. CODE §21305 (a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 17).
72. Supra note 31 and the accompanying text; Assembly Member Kaloogian, Background Information on
AB 1491, at 5 (Apr. 29, 2000).
73. Id.
74. See Carchidi, supra note 40, at 618-57 (demonstrating cases in which testator's in constructing a "no
contest" clause failed to foresee the grounds on which beneficiaries's would challenge their will or trust).
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situations enumerated in the statute,75 testators will be forced to include everything
listed in the statue, thus unnecessarily lengthening and complicating the "no contest"
clause in their testamentary documents.76
Furthermore, the new statute is adverse to those who choose to write their own
holographic wills. 77 Not knowing the law, most people are going to fail to list in their
"no contest" clause the actions which under the new statute are not to be treated as
a contest unless specifically stated as such in a clause.78 Unaware of the new law,
thinking that a generic "no contest" clause79 is going to give them maximum
protection, those who write holographic wills are going to expose their will to
challenges aimed at thwarting their testamentary intent.80 For example, suppose John
Smith dies leaving behind a holographic will which conveys his yacht and his Lexis
to his son, John Smith Jr. and his house to his wife, Thelma Smith. The will contains
a general "no contest" clause.8 Thelma Smith challenges the will claiming that the
will gives John Jr. what is rightfully hers under community property law. Given the
new law, even if John Sr. intended such an action to be as a contest, the action will
not be treated as such because John Sr. did not expressly bar it in his "no contest"
clause. Hence, his generic "no contest" clause intending to bind beneficiaries to the
terms of his will may be ineffectual after Chapter 17.
B. Oral Will Contracts Under the New Law
In recent cases, such as Estate of Hously, recovery on an alleged oral will
agreement became as easy as claiming that the testator promised to leave everything
in a will to the plaintiff in exchange for his services and that the plaintiff relied on
82that promise to his detriment. This not only circumvented the language of the
applicable statute but also violated case law aimed at honoring the intentions of the
deceased. 83 By requiring the plaintiff to show clear and convincing evidence of an
agreement or otherwise enforceable promise before awarding damages, the statue
protects the estate of the deceased by making it harder for plaintiffs to recover on oral
will agreements after the testator is long gone and is unavailable to testify on his
behalf.84 To further protect the intent of the deceased, Chapter 17 extends the
75. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305 (a)(l)(4) (enacted by Chapter 17) (listing those actions which are not to
be construed as being contests unless expressly stated in a "no contest" clause); see also note 40 and accompanying
text.
76. Id.
77. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 7 (Mar. 28, 2000).
78. Id.
79. See generally Sharon J. Ormond, No Contest Clauses in California Wills and Trusts: How Lucky Do You
Feel Playing the Wheel of Fortune?, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 613, 614 (1997).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Infra Part III.B.
83. Id.
84. ASSEMBLY MEMBER KALOOGIAN, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON AB 1491, at 4 (Apr. 29, 2000).
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application of the statue to agreements or promises to make or not to revoke other
commonly used testamentary instruments such as trusts.
85
Chapter 17 gives added assurance that the estate of the deceased will not endure
unending contests by ensuring that the statute of limitation for bringing a will
contract action is one year from the date of the testator's death.86 Since most estates
and trusts are distributed within 18 months after the date of death, a coherent statute
of limitations that will run one year from date of death will grant beneficiaries peace
of mind that their inheritance is not subject to challenge in the future.87 Morever, a
statue of limitations for all claims against an estate will give greater assurance to
fiduciaries in administering estates.88
Although Chapter 17 reinstates the standard of proof plaintiffs must meet in order
to recover on an oral will contract or an agreement, the language that it uses to do so
is unclear and is misleading.89 The new statue states that a "contract to make a will
or devise.. ." can be proven by "clear and convincing evidence of... a promise by
the decedent to the claimant that is enforceable in equity."9 Under contract theory,
a promise by a deceased to a claimant is not enough for the formation of a valid
contract 91. A contract to make a will or a devise is formed when the decadent, prior
to his death, makes an offer92 which the claimant accepts93 supported by
consideration.94 Hence, instead of stating a "contract" to make a will, the Legislature
would have been more precise in its expression if it had said a "promise" to make a
will can be proven by clear and convincing evidence of a promise by the deceased to
the defendant.
Furthermore, simply by reading the new statute it is hard to determine the intent
of the Legislature as to which legal \theorie a breach of an agreement or promise to
make a will is to be enforced. 95 The statute reads, an agreement to make a will, if
breach will be "enforced in equity., 96 Black's Law Dictionary defines "equity" as
85. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (a) (enacted by Chapter 17).
86. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMIFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 4 (Mar. 28, 2000).
87. See id. (explaining that permitting a claim to be commenced against an estate or trust after one year from
the date of death "would bring hardship to beneficiaries and administrators alike, and would frustrate the policy in
favor of the early closing and distribution of estates").
88. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 4 (Jan 11, 2000).
89. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (enacted by Chapter 17).
90. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 17).
91. See Lonergan v. Scolnick, 129 Cal. App. 2d 179, 182, 276 P.2d 8, 11 (1954) (stating "there can be no
contract unless the minds of the parties have met and mutually agreed upon some specific thing. This is usually
evidenced by one party making an offer which is accepted by the other party [and the agreement is supported by
consideration]").
92. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 24(1979) (defining offer as "manifestation of willingness
to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it").
93. See id. § 50 (laying out the ways in which one might accept an offer).
94. See id. §§ 71-81 (stating the requirements of consideration).
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (a) (4)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 17).
96. Id. § 21700 (a) (4) (enacted by Chapter 17).
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"fairness."97 The word "fairness" is broad and it does not capture the rights under
which the legislature intended one to be able to recover in an oral will agreement
cases. 98 Chapter 17 would have been accurate if it had stated that a promise to make
a will or devise, if proven with clear and convincing evidence, will be enforceable
under doctrines permitting the enforcement of promise without a consideration, thus,
including legal principles of promissory estoppe199 and restitution.'t°
VI. CONCLUSION
It is odd to watch what feverish ardor the Americans pursue property and how
they are ever tormented by the shadowy suspicion that they may not have chosen the
shortest route to get it.''
Building one's life around the struggle of collecting material possession seems
deeply rooted in our culture. However, once a person dies, her pursuit of goods ends
and another's pursuit of her goods begins. Many people may come forward, each
claiming to have a share in the estate of the deceased individual. For this reason,
probate laws must provide clear and certain application of the laws. Although
Chapter 17 has some weaknesses, it is effective in establishing some precision and
predictability not only in the interpretation of no contest clauses but also in the
enforcement of oral will contracts and promises and other procedural laws within the
probate code. 102
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (Pocket Edition 1996).
98. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 12-13 (Mar. 28, 2000)
(indicating the fact that under the new statute an oral will agreement may be enforced if proven by clear and
convincing evidence in the cases of promissory estoppel. This assertion is further supported by the cases which the
Legislature cites).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (stating that promissory estoppel is based on
the principle that "a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
100. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (Pocket Edition 1996) (defining restitution as
"compensation, reimbursement, indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from or loss caused to another").
101. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 356 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence Trans.,
1969).
102. Infra Part V.A. and B.

